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The Kripke-Putnam causal-historical theory of reference (Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975) has been strongly 
criticized as a general theory of reference about theoretical terms in science. Yet, as David Hull (1982) 
already noted, it appears that the causal-historical theory describes correctly how species names refer. 
For each newfound taxon, biological taxonomists lay down a ‘type specimen’ that carries with it the 
name of the taxon it belongs to. This ‘type method’ enables any two taxonomists to agree on the correct 
name of a given taxon, regardless of any disagreement they might have about what the true taxon 
boundaries are, and independently of future changes in taxonomic knowledge. In other words, in 
contemporary taxonomy a type specimen fixes the reference of a taxon without defining it. 
 
In a fascinating article, Lorraine Daston (2004) has retraced how the type method came to be. Using a 
backdrop of ‘epistemic virtues’ and ‘regimens of representation’ that structure her well-known work on 
the history of objectivity with Peter Galison (Daston, 1999; Daston & Galison, 1992; 2007), Daston 
reconstructs how, in the late 19th century, 
 
 William Whewell’s ‘Method of Type’ gradually evolved into the modern ‘type method’. This process, 
she argues, was one of ‘metaphysics in action’ or ‘applied metaphysics’, since the taxonomist who 
“eventually laid down the type method for preserving the stability of names, were primarily concerned 
with practices, not philosophy. Yet it was precisely their gradual articulation of a set of practices 
(publishing, labeling, traveling, referencing, compiling) centered on a collection of objects (type 
specimens), that is, an art of transmission, that turned [the type method] into a remarkable act of 
applied metaphysics, or so I shall argue.” (Daston, 2004, p. 157). 
 
 In this paper, I will argue that although Daston is right to direct attention to the ‘metaphysics in action’ 
of nineteenth century biological taxonomy, she misunderstands the nature of the metaphysics that was 
being negotiated. She fails to see that type method shows the causal theory at work. I will show that 
error has important repercussions, not only for Daston’s account of the history of the type method, but 
also for her broader account of the history of objectivity. 
 
The history of the type method 
 
Daston’s basic error resides in her assumption that type specimens not only function as reference-fixers 
of taxon names, but also serve to represent, describe and define the taxa they are part of. Starting from 
this false premise, Daston sets out to retrace how Whewell’s ‘Method of Type’ (Whewell, 1840), on 
which type specimens did serve as representative standards of comparison for their encompassing 
species, evolved into the modern type method through addition of the function of name-bearing. In 
reality, the notion of a type specimen underwent a more radical change in meaning. ‘Type specimen’ 
lost its old connotation of a typical standard of comparison, and came to refer to a standard of 
reference. Today it is true that no matter how atypical a type specimen is judged to be, it can still serve 
its role on the modern type method. On Whewell’s Method of Type, on the other hand, an ‘atypical 
type’ would have been a conceptual impossibility.  By delving further into mid-19th century debates on 
naming in taxonomy than Daston has done, I will show this fundamental change in meaning of the type 
specimen came about in a surprisingly gradual process. I will show how extensive debates and 
negotiations between professional and amateur taxonomists, and between those working in the 
peripheries versus at established museums, slowly altered what was understood by a ‘type specimen’. 
Where in the 1840s a type specimen was still universally understood to be a specimen that was deemed 
typical for its taxon according to the trained taxonomist’s judgment, the end of the 19th century had 
brought communal agreement about a type specimen being ‘fixed as typical’ by the first taxonomist 
who deemed it typical. From a philosophical vantage point, this meant that a causal theory of meaning 
was substituted for a descriptivist theory of meaning. The determination of ‘types’ no longer relied on 
(subjective) judgment, but on (objective, communally recognized) stipulation. 
 
The history of ‘objectivity’ 
 
Because Daston fails to understand what the type method amounts to, she also fails to see that the 
framework that structures her account of the history of objectivity does not apply. As soon as one 
realizes that the type method is a method of naming taxa, and not of representing them, it becomes 
clear that Daston and Galison’s account of shifting ‘regimens of representation’ won’t deliver any insight 
about the present case. What is more, the actual history of the type specimen shows that in an 
important sense Daston and Galison’s framework is too narrow, since it does not take into account how 
objectivity about reference standards was created in the 19th century. Thus, the actual history of the 
type method shows that their categories of ‘mechanical objectivity’ and ‘structural objectivity’ leave an 
important aspect of the history of objectivity unaccounted for. 
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